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Abstract   
Focusing on the Cold War Expo in Brussels 1958, this article takes the metaphor of 
“design diplomacy” as a lens through which to explore the dilemmas of Soviet 
exhibition planners charged with designing a modern image of the USSR at the World Fair. 
Seeking ways to represent the advantages of socialism to foreign, especially Western publics, 
the exhibition organizers began to question established Soviet tradecraft in the production of 
mass exhibitions, concluding instead that if the USSR was to make itself understood by the 
capitalist “other,” it must adopt selectively the idiom of its audience and interlocutor. The 
Soviet ‘self was constituted in relation to two main “others”: the USA, whose pavilion was 
adjacent to the Soviet one; and the anticipated public, about whom the Soviet designers knew 
little. As in diplomatic transactions, the art of persuasion demanded negotiation and 
compromise, resulting in a degree of transculturation and cross-fertilization.  
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The metaphor of “design diplomacy” provides a useful lens through which to 
examine how international relations have been materialized and played out in the 
multi-media form of international expositions, and, conversely, how the design of 
such expositions helped shape international relations. This essay turns this lens on the 
USSR’s self-presentation at Expo 58 in Brussels, the first World Fair of the Cold War 
era, held for six months from April 17, 1958. Focusing on the ways the Soviet 
exhibition planners conceived the task of presenting the USSR and socialist system to 
international and especially Western publics, it explores how the Expo provided a 
kind of miniaturized model of global geopolitics, where the two “world camps” of 
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Capitalism and State Socialism contested but also negotiated their claims for 
modernity, working out strategies for future moves, not only in terms of the message 
but also of the medium of exhibition design.  
The analogy of diplomacy usefully directs attention to the importance of 
dialogue and intercultural communication even in such adversarial contexts as the 
Cold War. Diplomacy requires not only an assertion of difference, but also an 
anticipation of and accommodation with one’s interlocutor’s agendas, culture, and 
idiom; a willingness to compromise; and a tacit agreement to observe the rules of 
civility and polite conversation. In the rhetoric used by the Belgian hosts, the Brussels 
Expo was to be an exercise in international relations by cultural means. It would, they 
hoped, engender a “new international atmosphere” (GARF9470/1/1, 6) of dialogue, 
reconciliation and rapprochement between the two camps, overcoming the tensions of 
the Cold War and enabling greater global cooperation to address some of the pressing 
problems of the age through the peaceful application of science and technology 
(NARA306/71A2101/159; NARA306/1011/1; Schroeder-Gudehus and Cloutier 1994, 
158).  
From their inception, World Fairs, dedicated to celebrating and promoting 
industrial and technological progress, served as sites of exchange, transmission and 
“internationalization.” They accelerated the process of technology transfer and spread 
a particular form of modernity. Thus, it has been proposed that they should be viewed 
as sites of Cold War “convergence” (Péteri 2012). The geometric figure of 
convergence implies, however, a rather mechanistic, deterministic model (Reid 2010). 
To think about the complex, multidimensional transactions under way at the World 
Fair it may be more productive to consider the Cold War Expo as a “contact zone,” a 
term drawn from cultural anthropology and linguistics to describe social spaces where 
disparate cultures “meet, clash, and grapple with each other” (Pratt 1992, 4). The idea 
of the contact zone emphasizes cultural transfer or “transculturation”—a form of 
appropriation and bricolage, whereby (usually subordinate or marginal) groups select 
and invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture. 
Envisaging multiple connections and cross-fertilizations, it foregrounds the 
reciprocal, “interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters” (Pratt 
1992, 7) and the way that subjects are constituted in and through their relations with 
each other. Furthermore, it emphasizes that the outcomes of convergence may be new 
 3 
hybrid cultural products: creole languages, for example, which enable communication 
without being identical with the “imperial” language (Pratt 1992, 6-7; Clifford 1997, 
192). By analogy, the effects on Soviet idiom in the Cold War Expo’s contact zone 
with the West would not necessarily result in its absorption into the language and 
values of the Western “other” (ideological “convergence” or rather conversion), but in 
a new hybrid cultural entity and enhanced possibilities for effectively communicating 
its worldview to the other camp.  
In what follows I will explore the USSR exhibition planners’ emerging 
understanding of their task at Brussels and of the challenges it presented to the 
established tradecraft of Soviet exhibition planning. The USSR pavilion was one of 
the most visited of the whole Expo, with a daily average of 120,000 visitors 
(GARF9518/1/590, 95, 248-49). But as the Soviet organizers themselves were 
painfully aware, it was a work in progress. It bore the scars of its birth in the midst of 
both the internal struggles of destalinization at home in the USSR and its bloc, and of 
the shifting demands of the global conflict and competition in the period of “peaceful 
coexistence,” the new more relaxed phase the Cold War entered after Stalin’s death.  
Expo ’58, I shall argue, was not only a site of “diplomatic” persuasion, but also a 
school in the arts of international public relations, exhibition design, and multimedia 
cross-cultural communication; the forms of modernity it diffused included the 
pavilion architecture, specific exhibits, and also the mode of exhibition display itself.  
This article will focus on the latter: how the Soviet exhibition planners 
conceived the contents and mode of display to go inside their pavilion, rather than on 
the architecture of the pavilion itself. It attends, in particular, to their representation of 
living standards, home, and consumption, terrain the capitalist West had already 
claimed as its own (Reid 2002, 211-52; Castillo 2010). Learning from both friends 
and adversaries, Soviet image-makers honed the weapons of soft power and visual 
strategies of cultural diplomacy and ideological warfare and began to shape up an 
image of the Soviet Union as a modern world power, an image it continued to develop 
and disseminate at subsequent fairs. Taking place in the late 1950s, the very moment 
when Soviet design was born as a profession, the encounters, negotiations, and 
deliberations in the Brussels contact zone were a formative experience for the 
emerging field of Soviet exhibition design (Rozhdestvenskii 1959; Brodskii 1959, 40-
41; TNAFO371 159601; Kliks 1978; Maistrovskaia 2009; Reid 2006; Hutchings 
 4 
1976). This process involved internalization and transculturation of aspects of the 
Cold War capitalist “other’s” approach to self-promotion as well as of its symbols.  
The Soviet approach to its self-presentation at Brussels was shaped by the 
terms of engagement at the World Fair set by the Belgian Expo committee, which 
sought to establish common ground amongst participants as a basis for reconciliation. 
The paper will address, first, the way that the allocation of directly adjacent territory 
to the leaders of the two Cold War camps made it necessary for Soviet planners to 
anticipate how their neighbour, the USA, would present itself; and second, the 
umbrella theme, “a new humanism,” also set by the Belgian hosts, to which all 
participants were obliged to refer. It will then turn to a third factor that influenced 
how the Soviets conceived their task: the anticipated viewer. For the “diplomacy” 
conducted through exhibition design was highly visible, even spectacular. Unlike the 
key historical events of government-to-government diplomacy, Brussels ’58 did not 
only involve meetings of important state representatives behind closed doors or 
through secret telephone conversations. The Expo was a dialogue conducted on a 
world stage before an audience that both sides courted. 
 
Common Ground  
Peaceful coexistence and cultural offensive: an exhibition not of goods, but of 
ideology  
<Fig. 1> 
The meanings of the term “diplomacy” include: “to do something with tact, 
discretion, delicacy, sensitivity to the possibility of causing ill will.” One dictionary 
(Dictionary.com) gives the example: “Seating one's dinner guests often calls for 
considerable diplomacy.” At Brussels, the Belgian hosts drew up their “seating plan” 
with the intention to make the USA and USSR engage in dialogue at the table, 
assigning the leaders of the two world camps contiguous plots (Haddow 1997, 95). 
The proximity of the Soviet and American pavilions compelled the designers to take 
account of each other and to anticipate the comparisons visitors would inevitably 
draw (GARF9470/1/22, 13; Devos 2009). The “seating plan” drawn up by the Belgian 
hosts was also, potentially, a massive diplomatic faux pas. But their fears that it might 
provoke a very undiplomatic showdown between the two great powers were trumped 
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by their sense of showmanship and concern to satisfy business sponsors as well as the 
general public, seeking entertainment at the fair (Schroeder-Gudehus 1994, 157-79).  
Notwithstanding the official rhetoric of reconciliation and cooperation, it was 
plain to all that Brussels would be a test of Cold War soft power, where the two 
antithetical “world camps” of socialism and capitalism would engage in what 
Frederick Barghoorn (1960, 87) termed the “cultural offensive.” Both would use the 
fair to set out their stalls for their competing, ideologically opposed models of 
progress and globalization. The fair would be “a site of struggle between the ideas of 
two worlds, capitalist and socialist,” where “each country would demonstrate and 
propagandize its way of life” (GARF94710/1/27, 27). Soviet intelligence spelled out 
the hostile ideological intentions behind the Belgian commission’s rhetoric of 
reconciliation: 
Brussels is an arena in which two worlds will struggle. They will 
strive to show the advantages of the capitalist order over the socialist. 
This idea is undoubtedly the main one for the organizers of the 
exhibition. (GARF9470/1/21, 162)  
The USA—Soviet sources reported—had also declared their intentions to “defend 
[their] cause, to fight against the communists,” by demonstrating “the superiority of 
the American way of life” in direct comparison with the USSR (GARF9470/1/21, 
199; GARF9518/1/588, 14-15; NARA306/1011/1). Howard Cullman, General 
Commissar of the US pavilion, pronounced that since “millions of visitors will 
compare the USA and USSR,” the exhibition “provides us and our friends in the free 
world with an unprecedented opportunity to show, as vividly as possible, our 
ideology, way of life and hopes for the future. …The free nations must make use of 
every possibility they have at their disposal to underline the meaning of the freedom 
they possess” (GARF9470/1/21, 199; GARF9518/1/588, 14-15; NARA306/1011/1). 
The Soviet organizers concluded: “We know that the Americans are preparing an 
exhibition not of goods, but of ideology” (GARF9518/1/588, 204). As a secret memo 
to the Party Central Committee warned, all the Western participating nations would 
treat the World Fair as a competition between the socialist and capitalist systems and 
would do battle in the realm of ideology, values, and meanings; they aimed to show 
“not what they produce, but what they represent” (GARF9518/1/588, 14, 27; cf. 
Schroeder-Gudehus 1994)).  
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The Soviet government formally accepted the invitation to participate in the 
Brussels fair on June 6, 1956 (GARF9470/1/22), recognizing both the challenges and 
the opportunities it presented. With nearly fifty states participating and a projected 35-
50 million viewers, Brussels “presents us with opportunities for propaganda such as 
we have surely never had in the post-war period in Europe” (GARF9470/1/27, 159-
60). In addition to the exhibition itself, the year-long publicity surrounding it afforded 
unprecedented channels for the Soviet Union to propagandize state socialism openly 
and legally in the West, using the West’s own airwaves and official media 
(GARF9470/1/3, 41-42; 9470/1/27, 127, 159-60; GARF9470/1/21, 205; GARF 
9470/1/22, 13). It was also a vital occasion for the Soviet Union to countervail the bad 
press it had received abroad as a result of its suppression of the Hungarian revolution 
in 1956 (GARF9470/1/21, 162).    
A number of state committees, departments and ministries were charged with 
preparing for this major propaganda campaign. A former Deputy Minister of the 
Ministry of Machine Tool Production and Automation, Dmitrii Ryzhkov, was 
appointed General Commissar of the Soviet section. The overall planning of the 
Soviet sector fell to two organizations: the USSR Chamber of Commerce under M.V. 
Nesterov, and the State Committee for Cultural Links with Foreign Countries, headed 
by former Pravda editor Georgii Zhukov (GARF9470/1/3; GARF9470/1/21). These 
bureaucracies had differing conceptions of the nature of the opportunity Brussels 
provided, and of how best to set out the Soviet stall. Nesterov’s Chamber of 
Commerce was oriented more towards using the Expo for developing trade links, and 
it appears to have been steeped in entrenched practices with venerable origins in late 
nineteenth-century trade fairs. Zhukov’s Committee for Cultural Links, meanwhile, 
was concerned with ideological influence and cultural offensive. As an exhibition of 
competing ideologies and ways of life, rather than a trade fair, Expo 58 demanded 
taking account of the Western viewer’s preconceptions and their exhibitionary culture 
(GARF9470/1/21, 205; GARF9518/1/588, 26-29, 36-44; Reid 2010). The archives 
reveal a clash of bureaucratic cultures and institutionalized approaches between these 
two bodies. This reflected, in microcosm, the wider battles raging back home in the 
USSR since Stalin’s death in 1953, between the friends and foes of destalinization, 
reform, and modernization.     
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Peering through the net curtain 
<Fig. 2 > 
From the outset, the USSR exhibition organizers recognized that the 
juxtaposition of their sector with that of the USA impelled them to take account of the 
American plans when designing their pavilion and the displays to go in it. However, 
information about American intentions was very hard to glean (NARA306/71A 
2101/159, 4). The better part of diplomacy is discretion—the careful management of 
the relation between secrecy and publicity. Likewise, secrecy, timing, and 
showmanship were central principles in preparations for Brussels. World Fairs 
compelled participating nations to engage in a balancing act between concealment and 
advertisement, both to arouse curiosity and preserve the element of surprise on 
opening, and to protect trade secrets and technological innovations (Rydell 1993, 208-
09). 
 This secrecy affected a key question: the architectural design of the pavilion.1 
Here, the Soviet organizers had to move ahead on the basis of informed guesses in the 
crucial planning stages (GARF9470/1/22, 64; GARF9470/1/21, 200-1). An open 
competition was announced in July 1956, from which the simplest design was chosen, 
a glazed parallelepiped emphasizing rationality, classical rigour and dignified restraint 
(Vasil’ev 1957, 43-6; Polianskii and Ratskevich 1958; GARF 9470/1/16, 102-4; 
GARF 9470/1/22, 34-45; GARF 9470/1/21, 199-200; GARF 9470/1/16, 104). The 
architects, a young collective including Andrei Boretskii and Anatolii Polianskii, 
explained that they consciously eschewed virtuoso gestures, such as the Western 
nations were expected to indulge in, for: “it would not befit us, the Soviet Union, to 
perform such extravagant tricks” (GARF9470/1/22, 39-40).  
 While disdaining to enter competition on such frivolous terms, the Soviet 
designers recognized that the contents of their pavilion must nevertheless “resonate 
polemically” with their American neighbour; for visitors to the exhibition could not 
avoid comparing the two adjacent expositions. Archival documents reveal the intense 
interest the Soviet planners took in every aspect of how America would present itself 
in their displays (e.g. GARF9470/1/21, 200-5; GARF9470/1/25, 74-77; 
GARF9518/1/588; Reid 2010).  However, a dearth of detailed intelligence left them 
guessing at their adversary’s intentions for the interior displays. The Soviet response 
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was based primarily on prejudice, rumors, and projections extrapolated from past 
performance. The imagined “Amerika” the Soviets anticipated became a constitutive 
part of the Soviet self-representation (GARF9470/1/21: 205; GARF9518/1/588: 207; 
GARF9470/1/25: 76-77).  
Soviet sleuths managed to glean information that the narrative of the US 
pavilion would focus on Fordist modernity and the American way of life, 
emphasizing two main ideas: living standards/prosperity and freedom/democracy 
(GARF9518/ 1/588, 204). This was to be expected, since prosperity and democracy 
had already been coupled in the USIA’s “People’s Capitalism” campaign (Hixson 
1997, 121-50). The US display would try to make capitalism appear more humane by 
laying claim to values that were positively identified with socialism: the equitable 
distribution of “political freedom, protection of the individual and opportunity for his 
growth, advancement in social welfare, cultural opportunity, and a fair share of 
material goods” (NARA306/1011/1, 2; NARA306/71 A2101/161; Rydell 1993, 198). 
Of one thing the Soviet planners were certain: the American pavilion would, 
Zhukov announced, “definitely have material about the good life [represented by] two 
cars to one family, a separate house with fifteen rooms, their wardrobe, and a 
mechanical kitchen where everything is electronic” (GARF9518/1/588, 204). Another 
report confirmed that the American kitchen would be featured in the form of two or 
three working fitted kitchens (GARF9470/1/9, 154). This, too, was a reasonable 
expectation given that, since the 1940s, the USIA had made extensive use of show 
homes and “American kitchens” saturated with labor-saving technology in its 
European propaganda campaigns promoting the “American way of life” (Castillo 
2005, 261-88; Castillo 2010; Cieraad 2009, 113-37). Model homes showcased 
American consumer goods while exemplifying the “humanism” of Marshall Plan 
materialism, People’s Capitalism, and consumer democracy in such a way as to 
appeal to the stereotypical European “man in the street” and, above all, “woman in the 
home.” Many other nations at Brussels also used model homes to demonstrate their 
national ideals and way of life as well as their consumer goods (Floré and de Kooning 
2003, 319-40).   
Zhukov’s intelligence about US plans proved inaccurate, however. To 
widespread surprise, the USA chose not to include a full-scale model home to show 
off the American way of life, but limited itself to displaying “Islands of Living.” The 
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decision to adopt an understated, soft sell approach resulted in part from a perceived 
need to redress European perceptions of America as a vulgar, consumerist parvenu by 
emphasizing, cool modernist design and high culture, and thus to lay claims to world 
cultural leadership in the field of high design (Haddow 1997, 153-68; Castillo 2010, 
139-70; Rydell 1993, 203-ff.; Morris 1959). The understatement of affluent 
consumerism was also a matter of “diplomacy,” in the sense of tact towards 
impoverished European populations. USIA-sponsored opinion surveys of European 
reception of American displays at international exhibitions had taught an important 
lesson: that America’s material abundance and advanced technology must be 
rebranded for European consumption as a concern for the good of man, and, 
particularly, woman: “What is often called our ‘materialism’ is really only a means to 
a greater humanism” (NARA306/1050/7). Thus, the Brussels display should not be 
commercial, boastful, or didactic, US advisers indicated. It “should not belabor the 
obvious by playing up American wealth, power, machinery or gadgets.” 
(NARA306/1011/1) 
Soviet intelligence also anticipated that the Americans would “inevitably” 
represent America as a land of democracy, freedom, and equality. (GARF9518/1/588, 
204-5) They would express the idea of democratic freedom in a number of oblique 
ways, such as special listening booths where visitors could listen to music of their 
choice, whereby “free choice” was equated with personal and political freedoms 
(Bol’shakov 1959, 28). On this score, Soviet intelligence was right: the rhetoric of 
freedom, individual choice, candour, ease, and spontaneity was expressed both by 
Edward Durrell Stone’s pleasure-dome architecture and by Peter Harnden and 
Bernard Rudofsky’s seemingly unstructured, fragmentary display in the interior, set 
out like a swimming pool, with lounge chairs and ice cream, where one could relax, 
eat, drink, and watch fashion shows. (Rydell 1993, 206-11; Hixson 1997, 143; 
Haddow 1997, 110; Scott 2007). Visitors reportedly said that they felt “complete and 
unrestricted freedom in the U.S. Pavilion” (NARA 306/1011/1), and appreciated “the 
friendly, gay atmosphere” (NARA 306/71A2101/159, 29). Everything combined to 
suggest that this was a place for entertainment, relaxation, indulgence, and play 
(Haddow 1997; GARF9470/1/21, 200-1; GARF9470/1/25, 74; GARF9518/1/588, 
207; Scott 2007). 
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The design of the USA pavilion was premised both on a notion of the 
“American spirit,” identified with openness and naturalness, and on a set of ideas 
about the specificity of exhibitions and about the nature of the viewer and his/her visit 
agenda. These understood the World Fair as a spectacular and dynamic multisensory 
medium of mass communication akin to that quintessentially modern experience, 
tourism (Urry 1990, 4-10; Scott 2007). The fair-goer, it assumed, had come to have a 
good time, to relax and be entertained. Ideas must therefore be conveyed not through 
theoretical concepts or abstract precepts but through concrete examples, images and 
tangible things.  
In contrast to other mass media an exhibit best conveys abstract ideas 
and intuitive feelings through the skilful arrangement of carefully 
chosen objects, not through the written word. The best way to sell 
America is the “soft pitch”… All in all, the visitor must be pleased, 
flattered and amused. The minute he feels that he is being “educated” 
or “fed a line” the battle for his mind is lost. The Fair visitor, whether 
he be a streetcleaner or a university professor, goes to the Fair for 
entertainment. The didactic approach is not the way to reach him in 
that state of mind. (NARA306/1011/1, 9) 
 
In these respects, the US pavilion epitomized some important trends in the design of 
World Fairs. First, since the beginning of the century such fairs had increasingly 
shifted away from edification and a “culture of production” towards mass 
entertainment (Rydell 1993, 116; Nye 1994, 141; Clasen and Rockwell 1968). 
Already at the 1939 New York World Fair, the ideal viewer was conceived as a 
“citizen-tourist,” whose gaze was directed towards experiences that reaffirmed the 
centrality of consumption and leisure (Rydell 1993, 130; Urry 1990). Second, it 
exemplified the increasing importance, in the postwar period, of the idea of 
information and the use of communications technology and multisensory 
bombardment (Colomina 2001). The Soviet planners learned in advance how cutting-
edge cinematic technology would be harnessed to present the American way of life; 
the chief “hook and propaganda device” would be a film America, Land and People 
projected in 360 degrees in a Circarama (Disney), which was to be shown for the first 
time outside the USA (GARF9470/1/9, 154). The viewer, placed in the center, would 
feel like a participant in the events shown on screen (GARF9470/1/25, 76-77).  
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“Socialist humanism”: the Soviet response to the general theme 
Common ground among the Cold War adversaries was imposed not only 
spatially—by contiguity—but also conceptually: by the umbrella theme set by the 
Belgian exhibition organizers, “for a more human world.” According to the 
Commissar General, each nation was to demonstrate “its own conception of happiness 
and of the paths to attaining it” (Devos 2015, 154, n.2; Haddow 1997, 94-95). All 
were to demonstrate how scientific progress would improve human life for all. The 
common message was summed up: “Hope, Happiness and Humanism under the 
shadow of the atom.” The fair must express “hope that man, on the threshold of the 
Atomic Age, may find a better means of achieving human understanding and peace” 
(NARA306/71A2101/159; NARA306/1011/1). 
Western accounts of Brussels, both contemporaneous and historical, have 
drawn a stark dichotomy between the US and Soviet pavilions. According to Walter 
Hixson, while the Americans “respected” the fair’s theme of “a new humanism,” the 
USSR, by contrast, “ignored” it (Hixson 1997, 144). And while “The Americans 
seemed to be saying …‘Relax a little and learn something of how we live,’” the 
Soviets “filled their exhibition with machine tools, model hydroelectric dams, and 
statistics on industrial growth, as if to say, ‘We are large, we are powerful, we have 
science and industry…And we owe it all to communism.’” (William Anderson quoted 
in Hixson 1997: 144-45;) These and other accounts imply that while the US was 
modern, dynamic, and responsive to its audience, the USSR doggedly pursued a 
didactic approach that was now outdated (Schroeder-Gudehus 1994: 168-69; Alloway 
1961, 44-6). 
The selection of exhibits and design of the displays was undoubtedly 
compromised as a result of internal divisions between forces of innovation and 
institutional inertia, modernization and Stalinism. However, we should be aware that 
the incoherence and overkill ascribed to the USSR pavilion in Western accounts was a 
common Cold-War othering trope. The contemporary and retrospective evaluations of 
the competing pavilions’ was just as much terrain for a Cold War battle of 
representations as were the exhibits themselves. Moreover, the condescending 
opinions of professional journalists and experts do not reflect the contemporary 
response of the lay public. US surveys during and after the fair found the USA 
lagging worryingly far behind the USSR and other socialist pavilions in mass 
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popularity. Much to the consternation of the US Information Agency, visitors flocked 
to the USSR pavilion. In the first three months, of the total 10,549,227 visitors to the 
Expo, over seven million (around three quarters) visited the USSR pavilion 
(GARF9518/1/590, 95, 248-49). Surveys of visitor satisfaction supplemented 
quantitative with qualitative evidence; they indicated that visitors to the fair were 
more interested in and impressed by the Soviet pavilion than by the US one. One 
USIA survey found “evidence that the Soviet Pavilion had greater favourable impact 
on visitor attitudes than did that of the US, despite apparently more frequent doubts 
about the credibility of the Soviet presentation” (NARA306/1011/2; 
NARA306/1011/1). 
If Western reports acknowledged the public’s interest in the Soviet pavilion, 
they generally ascribed it to Sputnik alone, a view that has been repeated in historical 
accounts (Schroeder-Gudehus 1994; Hixson 1997, 149). But for the Soviets, foreign 
fascination with Sputnik was not enough. The space-wonder might help pull in and 
impress the visitors, but what mattered was that they should take away the main 
message about the systemic superiority of socialism: what Soviet progress under 
socialism did for man (Bol’shakov 1959). This required engaging on the common 
ground established by the Expo’s umbrella theme, and doing so in terms that would 
be understood by “ordinary” Western viewers: by addressing such issues as living 
standards, housing, and consumption, and by adopting a mode of display that would 
engage and accommodate Western popular exhibitionary culture. 
Contrary to established views (Hixson 1997; Schroeder-Gudehus 1994), the 
Soviet planners conducted their deliberations in close reference to the umbrella slogan 
of the fair. They sought to embody the theme of hope, happiness, humanism and 
benevolent science, demonstrating socialist humanism and progress in the service of 
humanity and world peace (GARF9470/1/27; GARF9470/1/9; GARF9518/1/588, 14, 
27). Since capitalist propaganda would try to demonstrate the superiority of the 
capitalist system in regard to the theme of “human happiness,” the Soviet display 
must also show how, under socialism, man was “at the centre of all its state 
institutions, all industry, of all art” (GARF9470/1/3, 56-61; GARF9470/1/21, 159-62; 
GARF9518/1/588, 27). Visitors must, furthermore, take away an understanding that 
the socialist path to progress was not only more “democratic,” but faster (a message it 
was particularly important to project to the World Fair’s virtual public in the 
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developing world, whom the USSR was avidly cultivating). Only the Soviet socialist 
system was fully able to apply the benefits of scientific and technological advance to 
the good of human beings (GARF9470/1/3, 7; Moscow News (1957), cited in NARA 
306/1011/1; GARF9470/1/27, 173-75; Novikov 1958, 24). 
The remainder of this essay will question Hixson and others’ Cold-War 
assumption of essential, immutable difference, focusing instead on negotiation and 
cross-fertilization. Notwithstanding substantive, systemic, ideological differences in 
the message conveyed, there was more room, in the contact zone of the world fair, for 
dialogic accommodation and transculturation between Soviet and Western approaches 
than has often been assumed. 
 
 
Soviet Model Homes  
<Fig: 3  > 
Not unlike the Americans, the Soviets illustrated the theme of progress and 
human happiness by emphasizing rising mass living standards and their effect on the 
lives of individuals and families. They aimed “to show how, on the basis of universal 
peace, a well-provided life is created for every person” (GARF9470/1/27, 152-59). 
Consumption and leisure were prominent themes in the Soviet displays and 
accompanying promotional imagery. A section was dedicated to “Objects of Popular 
Consumption,” including textiles, clothing, shoes, wine, chocolate, and other luxuries. 
It aimed to demonstrate the concern of the workers’ state to raise workers’ living 
standards and the diversity and high quality of Soviet consumer goods 
(GARF9518/1/588, 2-10; GARF9470/1/27, 133-36).  
Yet even as the USSR joined battle on terms which the USA and its European 
Marshall Plan recipients had claimed as their own (De Grazia 2005; Castillo 2010), it 
remained vital to emphasize the specifically socialist route to achieving higher living 
standards for the greatest number of people: not only through individual but collective 
consumption, welfare, services, social benefits, the right to rest, state maternity and 
childcare provision, and importantly, through social housing (GARF9470/1/27, 152-
59). Given that housing was a major social and economic issue throughout the 
postwar world, this was a point on which it could appeal to hearts and minds on both 
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sides of the Iron Curtain, as well as in the developing world.  
In the Soviet pavilion’s socialist take on the Expo theme of humanism and 
progress, the image of mass housing construction played a central role. A 
monumental painting by Alexander Deineka, For Peace (1958), set the tone by 
identifying the Soviet peace agenda, progressive technology, and socialist modernity 
with the benefits of urban construction. Photographs and statistics told of the 
reconstruction of war-damaged cities, and the construction of new mass housing 
regions, schools, and hospitals. Above all, the intensive industrialized housing 
campaign launched by Khrushchev on July 31, 1957 served as a platform for 
demonstrating the party-state’s concern for ordinary people’s welfare and the 
advantages of central planning (GARF9470/1/27, 139-49; TsK KPSS 1957). 
The exhibition planners were concerned to make Soviet promises and 
achievements in the realm of housing less abstract and more immediate to the 
viewers’ imagination. Soviet agencies had already taken an interest in the uses that 
Western nations made of model homes as a display format. In November 1957, they 
even invited the London Daily Mail to bring its “Ideal Home” Exhibition to Moscow 
for 1958 (TNABW2/532). At Brussels, the USSR pavilion included two life-size 
models of furnished apartment interiors representing the new standard, prefabricated, 
small-scale flats designed for single-family occupancy, recently put into mass 
production. They were fully furnished in a conservative modern style, and included 
kitchens where one could see domestic equipment including refrigerators, vacuum 
cleaners, and other electric appliances (GARF9470/1/16, 299; RGAE635/1/369, 15; 
Meeren 1958, 29-34). Thus, the viewer moved from photos and figures representing 
the scale of mass housing construction into the interior of an individual dwelling, 
where they might imagine the domestic comfort and joys of “private life” enjoyed by 
the Soviet family in housing provided by the state and public purse.  
The Soviet organizers were well aware of the contradictions and pitfalls of this 
approach; in adopting domestic space, and specifically a home designed for an 
individual nuclear family, as a site to project Soviet ideals and achievements, they 
were raiding the rhetorical arsenal and idiom of the capitalist adversary, poaching a 
symbol closely identified with “Amerika”. Believing their (erroneous) intelligence 
that the Americans would “definitely” show a model home (GARF9518/1/588, 204), 
they were also nervous that this strategy of adopting the Cold War Other’s idiom 
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could backfire. How would the display of prefabricated industrialized mass housing 
resonate with the foreign audience, especially in light of anti-Soviet propaganda and 
the comparative context? “As regards showing apartments,” Kuznetsov warned,   
in regard to the construction industry we are not ahead. It is better to 
show the reconstruction of cities destroyed in the war. Here, the city in 
ruins; there, as it is today. Or take the South West region of Moscow: 
to show who lives there. In the West they wrote that this little town is 
being constructed for ministers and functionaries. You’re not going to 
amaze them with the fact that so many apartments have been built. 
(GARF9518/1/588, 207)  
Zhukov was also worried about how a display of Soviet model homes would be 
received in the comparative, international context of the Brussels fair. “It will not be 
convincing and will arouse ridicule.…Moreover, it is necessary to think about the 
things that will resonate polemically with the American ones.” (GARF 9518/1/588, 
204) Compared to the separate house of fifteen rooms, with two cars and an electric 
kitchen—which Zhukov’s sources predicted the US pavilion would “definitely” use to 
demonstrate prosperity—these standard, minimal-specification apartments might not, 
they feared, persuade the foreign viewer that the USSR was the land of abundance 
and high living standards for all.  
To be sure, the kitchen equipment fell far short of the American “Atomic” and 
“Miracle” kitchens exhibited around Europe (and shown in Moscow the following 
year), as well as of Jacques Dupuis’ futuristic Electric House shown in the Belgian 
sector at Brussels (Floré and de Kooning 2003; Shaginian 1964). However, such 
kitchens were received by European publics as science fiction (Cieraad, 2009). The 
Soviet kitchen, by contrast, represented a more realistic and attainable improvement 
on most Europeans’ kitchens in the 1950s. It is telling that three years later, the 
British press described the Soviet trade fair at Earl’s Court (1961) as a “paradise for 
housewives,” with its exhibits including refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum 
cleaners and other household items “which Soviet women can acquire for affordable 
prices—cheaper than such things in London” (Daily Sketch 1961, cutting in GARF 
9518/1/611, 96). The Belgian design press in 1958 also acknowledged that although 
the furniture in the interior settings did not represent cutting-edge design like that 
exhibited in the US pavilion, it was more likely to appeal to mass taste (Meeren 
1958). 
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Public Relations: learning from the enemy and anticipating the viewer in the 
contact zone 
The third and final condition to consider, which  shaped the presentation of the 
Soviet “self,” was the nature of the anticipated mass international audience, before 
whom the competition between East and West was played out and which both sides 
courted. Zhukov and his allies were beset by questions about how best to persuade the 
unknown Western audience and ensure that their message would not get lost in 
translation. And like the Americans, they were concerned to do so diplomatically, 
tactfully, in such a way that visitors would have their minds changed without realizing 
it. I proposed above that international expos might be considered “contact zones” 
where, in the process of intercultural communication, local or national idioms 
underwent transculturation and hybridization. This final section considers the effect of 
contacts both with foreign (especially Western) viewers and with foreign practices of 
display, marketing, and public relations.   
 It was one thing to tell the story of progress under the socialist system for an 
audience of Soviet citizens, already familiar with and able to decode it. But, the 
Soviet designers worried, how to represent the Soviet path to progress in ways that 
would be compelling to a potentially hostile Western audience? How might they 
demonstrate the dynamics of progress through time and its systemic causes—the 
Revolution, party guidance, and socialist central planning—in the visual form of an 
exhibition, and in such a way that the foreign audience would stop, look, and 
understand? (GARF9470/1/21, 205-8; GARF9518/1/588, 2-10)  
The Soviet organizers recognized that the intercultural obstacles to 
communicating their message about the system-specific origins of Hope, Happiness 
and Humanism included the assumed prejudices and false consciousness of the 
Western viewer, long subjected to anti-Soviet propaganda. For example, they wanted 
to emphasize the right to labour, guaranteed in the Soviet constitution, but Western 
viewers, enslaved by the alienated conditions of capitalist production and 
brainwashed by capitalist propaganda about Soviet oppression, might misinterpret 
this. Zhukov worried: “But do Western people understand that labour is the main 
element of happiness?” (GARF9518/1/588, 204; GARF 470/1/9, 156) They were 
fearful that viewers would project their ossified stereotypes onto the Soviet display, 
orientalizing it as the backward other of capitalist modernity, fears which the Western 
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accounts discussed above proved justified. Regarding the important story of socialist 
progress in the countryside and the modernization of agriculture, for example: “It is 
not enough to say we have ploughed up x number of hectares.…They don’t care a 
damn about that. They [just] recall the Russian peasant in bast shoes and a ragged 
peasant’s coat.” (GARF9518/1/588, 204) 
It was vital, Zhukov argued, to find exhibition strategies to counter such 
Western stereotypes, to break through the blinkers of false consciousness, and to build 
defenses against anti-Soviet propaganda into the exhibition (GARF9518/1/588, 26). 
For example, US disinformation was sure to represent Soviet life in terms of 
standardization and de-individualization. The need to contradict this slander made it 
essential to emphasize the individual and everyday life, on which Zhukov insisted. 
His colleague Kuznetsov confirmed:  
Abroad they write that here we have barracks and standardization and that 
individuality is suppressed. Therefore we need to show somehow that here 
the individual is ascendant and flourishes. … In the West they constantly try 
to prove that under socialism, and even more under communism, the 
individual is reduced to a faceless number. On the contrary, we need first to 
show the conditions for the development of the individual and then starting 
out from showing [individual] people we can then make generalizations. 
(GARF9518/1/ 588, 192-206) 
The Soviet planners started out from an assumption that Western viewers, subjects of 
capitalism, were the antithesis of the Soviet public. The latter was widely constructed 
as the “most reading people,” committed to learning and self-improvement. The West 
European public, by contrast, had different expectations of a day out at the fair and a 
different culture of exhibition viewing. They were “not like the Chinese, who study 
every question in detail” and “not as we understand [the public] in the USSR, [where] 
a kolkhoz farmer or worker from a factory will stand by the conveyor belt with a 
notebook and study.” While “there might be one or two students looking for answers 
or to improve their qualifications, the rest of the visitors will not come looking for 
further education” but merely to pass time. “Therefore we must have radio, television, 
give out free literature, so that they take away the impression of superiority of the 
Soviet order in all areas.” (GARF9470/1/21, 207-8) 
But how well did the Soviet organizers know the Western mass viewer, to 
whose interests their exposition had to appeal, and whose short attention span and 
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distracted mode of viewing it had to accommodate? They had very limited direct 
contact with ordinary people in the capitalist West, and lacked systematic market 
research on which they might draw. To overcome their knowledge gap, the Soviets 
took advice from socialist allies and the Belgium-USSR Friendship Society. More 
surprisingly, they also adopted the market research methods of the capitalist enemy, 
enlisting the services of a Belgian public relations consultancy, identified in the 
Russian stenographers’ report as “Pabli Sintez”—possibly a mis-rendering of 
“Publicité” (GARF9470/1/10, 147-78; GARF9518/1/588, 192).  
The advertising agency’s report advised the Soviet organizers that, in 
demonstrating Soviet economic progress, the exhibition must show that, “The brand 
‘Made in the USSR’ is able to compete on world markets with international 
products.” (GARF9470/1/10, 161) More broadly, they advised the Soviets to 
“penetrate into the psychology of your interlocutor and accommodate yourself to it as 
best you can” (GARF 9470/1/10, 148; Siegelbaum 2012, 128, n.28). This marketing 
psychology, the conventional wisdom of public relations, is arguably also the basis of 
diplomacy. 
Significantly, the public the Soviet planners imagined with the help of the PR 
firm was little different from the fair-goer hailed by the US pavilion. Like tourists, 
they came not for edification but for entertainment and relaxation, a day out at the 
fair, and a souvenir to take home–precisely the experience the American exhibit 
offered in its pleasure dome. Just as American advisers had cautioned their own 
designers, direct propaganda had to be avoided at all costs because it was likely to 
backfire (GARF9470/1/21, 161): 
Foreign readers don’t like to read a lot or for long....We love agitation, but the 
foreign reader won’t tolerate it. Therefore our brochure must be short and, in 
light of what the foreign reader is used to, we must attend to such media as 
cinema, television, posters—that which gives pleasure and from which they 
can obtain a dose of positive information about the Soviet Union. 
(GARF9470/1/21, 168) 
The mode of address, the visual language, and the syntax of the display all had to take 
account of the foreign public’s exhibitionary culture, shaped, they assumed, by 
modern capitalist modes of communications (admass) and display (department stores) 
with their multisensory bombardment. The viewer was imagined as suffering from 
what Beatriz Colomina (2001, 6–29) has diagnosed as a kind of collective Attention 
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Deficit Disorder. This, in turn, made it necessary to keep pace with the international 
trend towards interactive and dynamic displays. “Everything must turn, move, wink, 
catch the eye,” said Zhukov (GARF9518/1/588, 207). Rather than lecture or argue a 
case, the exhibition should lure the viewer “using the style of tourism.” Just as the US 
pavilion sought to convey a sense of ease, the consultants advised the Soviets to adopt 
a relaxed, unconstrained, and personalized manner. Visitors must feel welcome in the 
Soviet pavilion as in a good hotel; the foreign public should be met, metaphorically, 
with a smile, and “every visitor must feel that he is being greeted individually” so that 
when they left the pavilion they would feel a pang of homesickness for the Soviet 
Union and would say: “you feel most at home in the USSR pavilion.” (9470/1/10, 
172-3) 
 The Belgian consultants also urged their Soviet client to take account of 
differences among the viewers and accommodate their prejudices, predictable 
responses, and general ignorance about Russia. Reproducing conventional gender 
stereotypes, they advised targeting women. Female visitors would be ignorant but 
“curious…and often driven by simple instinct.” Once their curiosity was aroused they 
would want to talk about it. While men were “always interested in politics and 
international affairs,” and would come to the exhibition seeking confirmation of their 
preconceived ideas, women would pay more attention to the everyday life of the 
Soviet individual, while ignoring statistics about the growth of industry and trade. 
“Lovers of piquant detail, women will want to know about the life of women in the 
USSR. The housewife is bound to take an interest in how the housewife lives in the 
USSR.” Just as numerous publications and exhibitions of the 1950s personified the 
American way of life in the female form of the pushbutton housewife, so too the 
Soviet way of life was to be represented in such a way as to hail women in their roles 
as mothers, wives, homemakers, and consumers. Therefore, the exhibition must 
engage women first, and through their mediation, reach and influence men 
(GARF9470/1/10, 147-50). The PR firm’s advice evidently convinced Zhukov and 
his colleagues, confirming their own instincts and gendered assumptions. According 
to Kuznetsov, “The [exhibition] plan must be very clever but also simple and 
lively....Along comes a housewife wanting to know how a housewife lives in the 
Soviet Union, what kind of stove she has, how she swaddles a baby…how we live” 
(GARF9518/1/588, 193). Trying to imagine the European visitor to the Soviet 
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pavilion for the purpose of planning the display, Zhukov’s Committee for Cultural 
Links, just like the US planners for Brussels, envisaged her in stereotypically female 
form. 
The exhibitionary culture of the anticipated viewer had implications both for 
what the Soviets should show and how: the mode of display. The Western viewer was 
given to scepticism rooted in a Cartesian tradition of “seeing is believing,” the PR 
firm warned. Therefore, an emphasis on visual evidence was essential 
(GARF9470/1/10, 154). Zhukov concurred. “Western people are used to maximum 
visual aids. It is very hard to reach them with abstractions.” (GARF9518/1/588, 205) 
His assistant Kuznetsov added, “In the West, their thinking about abstract concepts is 
primitive. They love to feel and look. This aspect has to be kept in mind.” 
(GARF9518/1/588, 205-6) All this demanded a different mode of display from that 
which was customary back home for the Soviet public. The culture of the anticipated 
foreign viewer and her putatively low level of intelligence made a dynamic and 
multisensory approach necessary, appealing directly to sight and touch rather than 
abstract thought, using entertaining and amusing devices to grab and hold their 
attention. Animation and working models were vital to animate the displays 
(GARF9470/1/22, 38; GARF9470/1/21, 207). A non-didactic, soft sell approach was 
required, to minister a drop of information with a spoonful of sugar. “The display 
must be precise, engaging, and not boring, so that when a person has been in our 
pavilion he will involuntarily feel what is Soviet power, the Soviet land, whether he 
wants to or not” (GARF9470/1/21, 207 (emphasis added)). Above all, “Visitors to the 
exhibition should not receive some kind of seminar at it.” (GARF 9518/1/588, 207) A 
Soviet journalist with a reputation for bold innovation, Vasilii Zakharchenko (drafted 
in to bolster Zhukov’s efforts to modernize and internationalize display practice in 
face of the Chamber of Commerce’s resistance) declared: “We, the host, must not 
only broadcast, but also smile, joke, engage in conversation, and not assume the role 
of a schoolteacher. ”(GARF9470/1/11, 172-76; GARF9518/1/588, 20, 53, 55; 
GARF9470/1/10, 92) Zakharchenko’s comment, as Lewis Siegelbaum has noted 
(2012, 127), would not be out of place on Madison Avenue. Indeed, the approach 
Zhukov sought to adopt, alongside the feminized address the PR firm advocated, had 
more in common than hitherto acknowledged with the American pavilion, with its 
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focus on the individual as the beneficiary of progress, on personal life, and on leisure, 
pleasure, and ease. Both were aiming at the same imagined viewer. 
Conclusion  
The Soviet self-representation at Brussels took shape in tandem with the 
exhibition planners’ growing understanding of the dual “other”: both the expected and 
actual display by its Cold War adversary, the USA; and the international, especially 
Western, public. Responding to what they thought they knew about the American 
plans, encouraged by Western PR consultants, and taking on board the Western 
“other’s” anticipated prejudices about the Soviet Union, Zhukov and his team 
identified an approach that focused on the benefits of socialism as they were felt by 
the individual in everyday life. The problem of trans-systemic and transcultural 
communication was not only a matter of the message, however, but also of the 
medium. To appeal to the Western viewer required a more entertaining and 
spectacular approach: avoiding didacticism and making the displays as visual, 
immediate, and dynamic as possible. A new set of images of a reformed, more 
human-faced socialist modernity was accompanied by the beginning of a shift toward 
greater appeal to pleasure and emphasis on visual communication.   
While subsequent exhibitions such as in New York (Rozhdestvenskii 1959) 
the following year and Expo ’67 in Montreal (Eco 1986 [1967]) lie beyond the scope 
of this article, Brussels served as a training ground for Soviet display professionals, 
compelling them to measure themselves against international standards, and 
promoting appropriations and rapprochements both in the culture of display and in the 
iconography of progress. The more flexible and innovative institutions and individuals 
involved in the Soviet exhibition design came to understand that effective and 
persuasive communication across the Cold War divide required diplomatic 
compromise and accommodation. The Soviet display at the World Fair must capture 
the capitalist West’s rhetorical arsenal, assimilate display modes and symbols it had 
made its own, and turn them against it. As in diplomatic negotiations, if the USSR 
was to be heard and understood in the way it wanted to be, it had to compromise and 
ventriloquize, strategically adopting the idiom of the Cold War adversary and 
translating itself into a visual language the other could comprehend.  
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The juxtaposition of America and the Soviet Union may not have resulted in 
the reconciliation, on the West’s terms, which the Belgian hosts had hoped to 
engineer. It did, however, make dialogue and inter-referentiality unavoidable. As in 
Pratt’s contact zone, new hybrid identities and creole modes of communication were 
forged in the process of transculturation. The Soviet representation of its “self” was 
constituted both through the internalization of the imagined other and by selective 
syncretic assimilation of the other’s symbolic language.  
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